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Members of the 67th World Health Assembly in 2014 were presented with a framework document to guide World Health Organization (WHO) 
engagement with non-state actors, a key part of WHO 
reform kick-started in 2011. According to this document, 
non-state actors include four distinct constituencies: i) non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), ii) private sector entities; 
iii) philanthropic foundations; iv) academic institutions (1). 
While the WHO has collaborated in a variety of ways with 
non-state actors since its foundation, a comprehensive policy 
for engagement has remained elusive and politically fraught. 
Some commentators are concerned that a more formal 
engagement will strengthen the already undue influence 
of well-resourced non-state actors, particularly companies, 
who seek to influence policy and priorities through extra-
budgetary project funding (2). The World Health Assembly 
has requested the WHO Secretariat to go back and develop 
the policy further, leaving the organisation without clear 
guidelines on how it is to engage with non-state actors.  
Among the many criticisms levelled at the WHO, a persistent 
claim has been that it has become overly bureaucratic and 
overly politicised, leading one critic to remark that “it is 
where good ideas go to die” (3). According to former Director 
General Jack C Chow, the WHO is bogged down by the need 
for consensus, is primarily responsive to the disease-specific 
interests of donors, and suffers from an archaic governance 
system more akin to a federation of six regional offices (4). 
For Chow, the WHO risks becoming irrelevant, stagnating in 
a world where public health is changing rapidly. In the last 15 
years, it has been outpaced by younger and more agile rivals 
like the GAVI Alliance and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), whose very existence 
is seen as a reproach to the state-centric, bureaucratic and 
political WHO (2). Indeed, former Executive Director of the 
Global Fund Richard Feachem cited the decision to establish 
the Fund as a foundation independent of the UN system as 
one reason for enabling this new entity to become a technical, 
evidenced-driven entity.  He described the Fund as a “very 
apolitical organization... (where) we’ve been able to take 
principled and technical decisions which haven’t always been 
popular because we’re not subject to the political influences that 
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would come to bear in the UN” (5).
While the WHO certainly has its fair share of problems and 
continues to struggle in reforming its operations (3), it is not 
alone among the array of global health organisations subject 
to political pressures. Politics is also at the heart of newer 
organisations that claim to be driven by evidence and technical 
know-how (6). Feachem, himself “no boring bureaucrat or 
cautious political operator” (7), has been credited with having 
had an extraordinary influence on global health politics (7,8). 
For example, when faced with impending dissemination of 
early findings from the first independent research on the 
effects of the Global Fund on recipient countries’ health 
systems in 2003, his Secretariat sought to influence and 
control the message and how it was disseminated, which 
included putting pressure on the European bilateral donor 
agencies that were funding the research (9). Politics at its 
most basic is about influencing others. Moreover, politics is 
not distinct from nor carries on in parallel to policy, despite 
sometimes being treated as such. For better or worse, political 
dynamics play a critical role in shaping global health policy 
processes and cooperation, and are part of the ebb and flow of 
changing political fortune.  
The GAVI Alliance: Politics in partnerships
The GAVI Alliance was officially launched at the beginning 
of 2000, a public-private partnership involving the WHO, 
UNICEF, donor and implementing governments, the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates Foundation) and 
other select non-state actors. It emerged on the back of 
substantial donations from the Gates Foundation, followed by 
further commitments from a small number of major donor 
governments. The new organisation followed on the heels of 
the taskforce for Child Survival and the Children’s Vaccine 
Initiative (CVI), and introduced new forms of financing and 
governance that would later be adapted by other organisations 
(10). Up to 2008, it was an incorporated public-private 
partnership hosted by UNICEF, with the 501(c) (3) charity 
Vaccine Fund that financed its operations based in Seattle. 
The Vaccine Fund was effectively under the direction of staff 
associated with the Gates Foundation Child Vaccine Program 
(CVP) hosted by PATH in Seattle, a NGO closely associated 
with the Gates Foundation. 
As Bill Muraskin suggests, it was evidence of a ‘trust-in 
God-but-pass-the-ammunition’ attitude among a small, but 
influential vaccine policy community towards partnering 
with UN agencies and some donors—an insurance policy 
for an ascendant vaccine community based on an attitude 
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borne out of their frustration at the way in which multilateral 
and bilateral organisations work.  This largely US-based 
community was critical of the underfunding and bad 
management of immunization programmes, which allowed 
rivalries to undermine earlier partnerships like the CVI, 
including obstructing efforts to bring the vaccine industry 
into these partnership processes (11,12).  
The contentious environment in which GAVI emerged was 
fuelled by competing ideas and evidence on how best to 
increase immunisation coverage levels. Some saw a critical 
need to develop new vaccines; to verticalise and thereby 
strengthen the delivery architecture for these and underused 
vaccines; and to include non-state actors, primarily industry, 
in these processes.  The conflicting view came from those 
who considered broader health sector reform as a means 
to improving immunization services, where immunization 
services would be supported and improved only in the context 
of public health systems development; and that prioritising the 
hard to reach, the poor and other neglected populations with 
existing vaccines took priority over investing in and rolling 
out new vaccines. The health reform and systems advocates 
were the more powerful policy community during the 1990s, 
though they may not have been alert to the ascendency of 
a small, hidden but powerful vaccine community that had 
developed strong ties to the well-resourced Gates Foundation 
during the latter years of the decade. 
In a report from a meeting organised by the WHO Department 
of Vaccines and Biologicals on health sector reform and 
immunization held in Washington on the eve of GAVI’s 
launch, those favouring priority vertical immunization 
programmes, “who may feel threatened or devalued during 
health sector reform/development” were advised that their 
“pro-active engagement and support is likely to prove a more 
effective response than maintaining a distance, which may risk 
loss of influence” (13).  Within a  couple of years however, with 
the establishment of the GAVI Alliance and then the Global 
Fund, it was donors and multilateral agencies promoting 
health sector reforms that were in danger of losing influence 
as the tide turned in favour of priority interventions, selected 
targets and engaging a wider set of actors beyond traditional 
state systems.
The Global Fund: Product of a very political process
While different in genesis, the emergence and evolution of the 
Global Fund was formed in an equally political climate, and 
following in the footsteps of the GAVI Alliance, moved global 
health into what Lidén terms an ‘age of grand ambitions’ (14). 
Following decades of insufficient action against the growing 
crisis and needless personal tragedies inflicted on millions by 
HIV and AIDS, a range of coalitions eventually found a way 
to break through the inertia. While the major timeline events 
leading up to the launch of the Global Fund are by now well 
documented (14), behind the scenes and in the run up to the 
launch different coalitions sought to shape the structure and 
policy priorities of the emerging organisation. 
For example, donor governments, far from being internally 
coherent not to mind a coherent bloc, were developing 
parallel approaches. Engaged in negotiations on what a 
new initiative might look like, the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), the UK Department for 
International Development (DfID), and USAID coalesced 
into the ‘Ottawa Group’ in 2000. This group sought to 
develop what they termed a ‘health systems response’ to 
communicable diseases, focusing in particular on HIV/AIDS, 
TB, malaria and communicable diseases of childhood, with 
the proposed Ottawa Fund having a state-centric governance 
structure (15). Also in 2000, the United States established a 
World Bank AIDS Marshall Plan Trust Fund Act (16). This 
Trust Fund was to be administered by the World Bank and 
governed by a Board of Trustees composed of representatives 
from participating donor countries, as well as pharmaceutical 
companies willing to donate to the Trust Fund. Governments 
and NGOs would be eligible for grants, which could be used 
for prevention, education, treatment, and care activities. 
In the period coming up to the Global Fund launch, NGOs 
had gained a degree of acceptance as part of the global health 
policy environment. With negotiations for a new initiative 
underway by May 2001, representatives from several NGOs 
directly entered the political foray and advocated for the new 
initiative to be a procurement fund for AIDS treatment. Many 
NGO representatives were driven by a belief that donors were 
manoeuvring to avoid committing to funding treatment, 
a belief that had basis in fact. For example, concerns were 
expressed about funding anti-retroviral treatment at the UK 
Development Committee meeting in Sep 2001, where many 
at this meeting “agreed that the ‘Anti-retroviral’ solution to 
the HIV/AIDS problem was impractical, especially in Africa, 
even as part of an overall scheme. If deployed by the [Global 
Health Fund] widely the budget would be rapidly depleted, but 
if rationed out to developing countries, the rich would benefit 
at a disproportionate level to the poor” (17). Minutes of this 
meeting also noted that some members anticipated that 
NGOs would ‘attempt to exert pressure to introduce ART as the 
[Global Health Fund’s] primary tool for combating HIV/AIDS’, 
which  presumably needed to be resisted. 
The division between prevention and treatment was a 
major point of tension between different groups, but it was 
a division that also existed within agencies like DfID, and 
which required senior personnel with substantial social 
skills for interpreting their environments, mobilising others 
to overcome differences and, thereby change the position of 
the organisation. The events described above are only a small 
sample of the micro-level political processes taking place in 
the run up to the launch of the Global Fund in 2002. The 
end settlement of all of these processes was a watershed by 
any standards, with the Global Fund Framework Document 
managing to capture many of the different positions and 
priorities of the stakeholders. Crucially, it led to the creation 
of an organisation that gave Board positions and voting 
rights to NGOs on a par with governments. Various political 
fault-lines came to be embedded in this document and 
would emerge at different times as the Global Fund evolved, 
including around ongoing tensions between placing emphasis 
on disease-specific or health systems approaches, an issue that 
would surface later in the 2000s in the GAVI Alliance as well 
(10). The resultant Fund was a platform that included a Board 
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and committee structures that enabled politics to be played 
out but contained behind closed doors; and a Secretariat that 
was led by a politically adept Executive Director, who sought 
to impose a model of working that was less concerned about 
treatment versus prevention and more concerned with driving 
results through performance-based funding.
Ooms and Hammonds (18) describe a natural tension 
between public health research and the right to health – a 
tension between an ‘appeal to tradition’ and an ‘appeal to 
faith’. For instance, right to health researchers, practitioners 
and advocates tend to challenge the practice of designing 
health policies premised on assumptions of a status quo 
in financial resources, a position they attribute to public 
health researchers. This public health ‘appeal to tradition’, 
Ooms and Hammonds suggest, underpinned the shift from 
comprehensive to selective primary healthcare, the latter 
considered a more cost-effective option in a context of limited 
financial resources during the 1980s. This natural tension 
can similarly be applied to different actors in the case of the 
Global Fund outlined above.
The ‘appeal to tradition’ was echoed in the position of some 
donors in their response to HIV and AIDS who, while 
recognising that comprehensive HIV prevention and AIDS 
treatment would be the optimal strategy, constrained their 
ambitions and initially prioritized prevention as an interim 
strategy until additional resources became available. It 
also suggested a lack of faith in the capacity of recipient 
governments and communities affected by AIDS to scale up 
treatment.  In the end, this conservative position was rejected, 
and the ‘appeal to faith’ became an empirical reality, in that 
treatment scale-up was being achieved - as it turned out, faith 
was justified in the face of the sceptics. Sustained pressure to 
substantially increase funding and re-draw the boundaries of 
what was possible and what ought to be done was realized 
through intensive political processes, with the newly formed 
Global Fund supporting and incentivising comprehensive 
government strategies that included AIDS treatment as well 
as HIV prevention.
 
Global health policy as political process  
Global health policy has the aim of improving population 
health at a global level. This can only be achieved, however, 
through engaging in political processes involving actors 
and ideas, through strategic actions these actors take, the 
institutional structures that enable or constrain their actions, 
and in the circumscribed political environments in which 
decisions are made and health policies are implemented. And 
like all political processes, natural tensions—often between 
organisations and individuals that share the same goal—
sometimes lie dormant and other times surface in ways that 
can undermine the shared aims of even the closest of allies.
Much of public health and health policy research remains 
largely concerned with measuring and evaluating policy 
impacts and outcomes and presenting recommendations for 
policy choices (19). Politics is treated as distinct from policy, 
an unwelcome ghost that causally interacts with the policy 
machine, disturbing rational decision-making and technical 
intervention. However, political and institutional factors are 
central to global health policy processes, down to and including 
the development and use of health evidence (19–21). Politics 
is of fundamental importance to public health researchers and 
requires at least a willingness to analyse, even where there is a 
reluctance to engage in, the politics of public policy.
A wide range of frameworks, each contested in their own right, 
are available to policy researchers to assist in understanding 
the complexity of political processes in global health policy. 
Longstanding theories on institutional rational choice, 
multiple-streams, punctuated-equilibrium, and advocacy 
coalition frameworks have been supplemented by more recent 
understandings of the role of networks in political processes 
and how people make and bring about political change or act 
to stabilize existing hierarchical orders (22). Despite being 
viewed by some as beyond the remit of public health research, 
the political is an enduring feature of global health policy, and 
therefore of health policy analysis. And whether researchers 
like it or not, we too are part of these political processes, 
generating evidence that aims to influence decision-making 
where such decisions are never politically neutral or without 
consequence. 
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